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Under federal-state law workers who quit a job are not entitled to receive unemploy-
ment insurance beneﬁts. To show how the existence of the uninsured aﬀe c t sw a g e sa n d
employment, I extend an equilibrium search model to account for two types of unemployed
workers: those who are currently receiving unemployment beneﬁts and for whom an increase
in unemployment beneﬁts reduces the incentive to work, and those who are currently not
insured. For these, work provides an added value in the form of future eligibility, and an
increase in unemployment beneﬁts increases their willingness to work. Incorporating both
types into a search model permits me to solve analytically for the endogenous wage dis-
persion and insurance rate in the economy. I show that, in general equilibrium when ﬁrms
adjust their job creation margin, the wage dispersion is reduced and the overall eﬀect of
beneﬁts can be signed: higher unemployment beneﬁts increase average wages and decrease
the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The empirical literature on unemployment insurance has stressed the disincentive to work that
unemployment beneﬁts provide. Meyer (1990) discusses the eﬀect on prolonged unemployment
spells, Cullen and Gruber (2000) show the reduction in spousal labor supply and Feldstein (1978)
points to the increase in temporary layoﬀs.1 The concern in these is that the increase in the
value of unemployment will tilt the decision of the marginal worker to opt for the higher paid
unemployment. Raising unemployment beneﬁts reduces labor supply or, alternatively, increases
the wages workers demand.
However, unemployment insurance (UI) also aﬀects the unemployed who are not insured
or ineligible. New entrants to the labor force, unemployed who have exhausted their beneﬁts,
unemployed who had unstable employment, and re-entrants to the labor force constitute more
than half of the unemployed and are all nonrecipients of beneﬁts.2 For them, work has an added
value in the form of future eligibility and unemployment beneﬁts rents. Work by Green and
Riddell (1993) and Levine (1993) suggest that this is not simply a theoretical curiosity. In the
ﬁrst case, disentitlement of the elderly from UI resulted in their withdrawal from the labor force.3
In the second case, an increase in beneﬁts was shown to reduce the unemployment duration of
the uninsured.4
Given the two opposing incentive eﬀects of UI on eligible and ineligible unemployed, and
given that the ineligible constitute the larger share of the unemployed, what is the total eﬀect
of unemployment beneﬁts on wages, layoﬀs, and unemployment? Mortensen (1977) pointed
out these two opposite incentive eﬀects of UI and analyzed the diﬀerential job search of the two
types. His analysis considered only the labor supply decision and concluded that "the predicted
1See also Topel (1983) for the eﬀects on layoﬀs and Krueger and Meyer (2002) for a survey of labor supply
eﬀects of unemployment insurance.
2Blank and Card (1991) estimate the fraction unemployed who are ineligible to be 0.57. See also Anderson
and Meyer (1997).
3The authors focus on adverse selection issues, but in fact their evidence is very relevant here, as the removal
of beneﬁts reduced the value of employment, which resulted in the subsequent decline in labor supply.
4Levine attributes this to the substitution between the insured and the uninsured. Given the increased beneﬁts,
the search of the insured decreases and facilitates job ﬁnding by the uninsured. However, his hypothesis is
observationally equivalent to the one posed here, that the uninsured search harder (and are more likely to work)
because of the added value in employment.
2sign of the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nb e n e ﬁts on unemployment duration is ambiguous."5 Recently
Krueger and Meyer (2002) restated the ambiguity result and suggested general equilibrium could
possibly magnify the adverse employment eﬀects of UI.
Here I show that neither of these conjectures is robust to general equilibrium. By integrating
the two eﬀects into a general equilibrium search model á la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
(Diamond 1982, Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides 2000) I trace the diﬀerential eﬀects of
UI on the two groups and show that while the diﬀerential eﬀect still exists in general equilibrium,
it is muted due to a form of cross-subsidization. I also ﬁnd that the total eﬀect is not ambiguous
and is the one found by the empirical literature: increasing generosity of UI increases wages and
unemployment. An additional outcome of the analysis is the derived rate of insurance in the
economy. Since workers who are eligible for UI tend to have longer unemployment durations,
they are disproportionately represented among the unemployed.
The driving force creating wage dispersion is that beneﬁt eligibility determines the Nash
wage outcome. Given complete contracts, negotiators’ bargaining positions are determined by
their initial conditions.6 Eligible negotiators are entitled to beneﬁts and can bargain to a higher
wage. This is the "pure entitlement" eﬀect, which ineligible negotiators lack. When bargaining
takes place over future ﬂows, an additional "future entitlement" eﬀect comes into play. Ineligible
negotiators experience an additional gain from work in the form of future UI entitlement and
are therefore willing to accept even lower wages.7
When the two unemployed types coexist, the diﬀerential eﬀects are reduced. A searching
ﬁrm expects to meet an average type of worker. If a worker who demands lower wages is actually
matched, the ﬁrm experiences a gain relative to its expectations. Sharing these gains with the
low wage worker increases his wage somewhat but leaves the overall eﬀect of beneﬁts on his
wages negative.
The total (or average or expected) eﬀects of beneﬁts on wages and employment, turn out to
5Mortensen (1977) pg. 506.
6These are the only relevant payoﬀs in case of disagreement.
7While the analysis takes up the Nash solution to wages, it is not crucial for the results. Directed search would
give the same dependency of wages on unemployment values. The main diﬀerence is that the cross-subsidization
result below disappears.
3be the standard ones.8 The eﬀect of increasing beneﬁts sums up to the pure entitlement eﬀect
on the insured group. In a steady-state equilibrium, the wage diﬀerences across the two types
are achieved through cross-subsidization between the groups. The only "real" eﬀect of beneﬁt
increase is that expected wages increase in proportion to the expected beneﬁt collection, which
depends on the size of the insured group.
This increase in expected wages is accompanied by a decline in market tightness. Taking
into account this general equilibrium eﬀect of deteriorating market tightness tends to reduce the
wages of both types, reducing the wages of the uninsured even further and mitigating the wage
increase of the insured.
U.S. unemployment policy provides a strong case for the analysis. Under the federal-state UI
program, unemployment beneﬁts are provided to qualiﬁed workers who are unemployed through
no fault of their own. An unemployed worker is eligible for beneﬁts if he was laid oﬀ, but not
if he quit or was ﬁred. Insurance is conditional on it being the ﬁrm’s decision to separate. The
model uses this conditional feature of U.S. policy to distinguish between those who are eligible
(unemployed who were laid oﬀ) and those who are ineligible (unemployed who quit their job).9
I ﬁrst present the extension of the basic search model to two types of unemployed workers
and explore the sources of the diﬀerential eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts on wages, the total
(average or expected) eﬀects and the general equilibrium eﬀects. To see the actual incentive
eﬀect, Section 3 introduces heterogeneous productivity and accordingly allows workers to decide
on an entry productivity. The lower wage of uninsured workers translates to their willingness to
work for lower productivities, leaving the pool of unemployed with a higher insurance rate. In
section 4 I calibrate the model and ﬁnd that the wage gap between the insured and the uninsured
is around 3%, and that market tightness is responsive to an increase in beneﬁts, while wages are
not. Section 5 concludes.
8These are the average wages of workers in the economy, which are the wages a ﬁrm opening a vacancy expects
to pay.
9Albrecht and Vroman (2005) use the limited duration of unemployment beneﬁts to justify equilibrium wage
dispersion similarly.
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2.1 Model
I extend a standard search model (Pissarides 2000) to allow for two types of unemployed: those
currently receiving unemployment beneﬁts and those who are not currently covered. The un-
employment eligibility status depends on how job separation and the fall into unemployment
occurred. If separation occurred because the worker quit, he is subsequently not eligible for UI.
If the fall into unemployment was caused by the ﬁrm’s decision to lay oﬀ the worker, then the
unemployed is eligible. The contract is completely speciﬁed at the time of engagement. This
pins down the original disagreement point as the only one relevant to surplus sharing. Search
frictions create quasi rents that can be split with both types, allowing for two wages to coexist.
Initially I consider a model where job take up is exogenous.
Time is continuous. There is a measure one of workers and a larger measure of ﬁrms, both
risk neutral. Let u0 + u1 be the measure of unemployed workers, where u0 is the measure of
the unemployed who are not receiving beneﬁts, and u1 is the measure of UI recipients. Denote
by b u0 = u0
u0+u1 the fraction of nonrecipients among the unemployed. The measure of vacant
ﬁrms is denoted by v , and the market tightness is deﬁned as θ = v
u0+u1 . Assume workers and
ﬁrms meet via a constant returns-to-scale matching technology, where the rate of job matches
p e ru n i to ft i m ei sg i v e nb ym(u0 +u1,v). The rate at which vacant ﬁrms meet workers is then
q(θ) ≡ m(u0 + u1,v)/v ,a n dt h er a t ea tw h i c hw o r k e r sﬁnd jobs is θq(θ). Note that, in this
speciﬁcation, search is not directed. When a ﬁrm decides to open a vacancy, it incurs a ﬂow
search cost γ0 while looking for a worker.
When a worker and a ﬁrm meet, they can jointly produce y. Upon being matched, the
uninsured negotiate a wage contract w0, and the insured negotiate a wage contract w1. These
wages are the Nash solutions to the bargaining problems over the present discounted value of
future ﬂows where the bargaining power of workers is given by 0 <β<1. Since it will turn out
that w1 >w 0, I will also use the terms "high wage" and "low wage."
Productivity is subject to bad shocks which arrive at a Poisson rate of λ and are followed











For now, assume that y>zso that it is always jointly eﬃcient to produce. There is also an
exogenous probability of workers quitting at a Poisson rate of s, after which the ex-worker is
not covered by UI since the separation was his fault. Figure 1 illustrates the ﬂow of workers
in and out of the four diﬀerent states, where l0 denotes the fraction of the labor force who are
employed at low wages and l1 denotes the fraction who are employed at high wages.
Denote by Jji the present discounted value of being in state ji, where j ∈ {U,E,V,F} ≡
{Unemployed,Employed,V acant,Filled} and i ∈ {0,1} ≡ {Uninsured,Insured}, indicates
the eligibility status. When joint production occurs, these values depend on the realized level of
production, y. Firms’ values possibly diﬀer depending on whether they match with an uninsured
or an insured worker (JE0(y) or JE1(y)), since the bargaining position of an insured worker is
more powerful than the bargaining position of an uninsured worker. The value of a vacant ﬁrm,
however, is simply JV . The values for a worker are similarly JU0, JU1 , JE0(y),a n dJE1(y).
The economy can be described by a series of Bellman equations.A vacant ﬁrm incurs the ﬂow
cost of opening a vacancy −γ0,a n dﬁnds a match at the rate q(θ). Since search is not directed,
with probability b u0 the worker is not receiving insurance, and hence the ﬁrm transitions to have
a value of JF0(y); alternatively, the ﬁrm meets an insured unemployed worker and transitions
6to have a value of JF1(y),
rJV = −γ0 + q(θ)[b u0(JF0(y) − JV )+( 1− b u0)(JF1(y) − JV )]. (1)
A ﬁlled ﬁrm that employs a previously uninsured worker gets a ﬂow of y − w0, and is either
hit by a productivity shock λ or by a taste/relocation shock s for the worker. In both cases, the
relationship is destroyed and the ﬁrm returns to its vacant state. If the ﬁrm employs a previously
insured worker, I simply adjust the wages contracted to be w1 and the ﬁrm value which reﬂects
this change is JF1. Therefore, the values of a ﬁrm with a ﬁlled position are, for i =0 ,1:
rJFi(y)=y − wi + λ[JV − JFi(y)] + s[JV − JFi(y)]. (2)
I can similarly describe the worker’s value in each state. When a worker is unemployed and
not eligible for UI, his ﬂow value is simply the expected gain from future matches. He will meet
a ﬁrm at a rate of θq(θ), at which point he’ll switch to have value JE0(y). An insured worker in
addition receives a ﬂow z while unemployed. For i =0 ,1 the unemployed values are given by
rJUi = zi+ θq(θ)(JEi(y) − JUi). (3)
Once a worker of previous status i is matched with a ﬁrm, he earns the ﬂow negotiated wage
wi and can separate from a ﬁrm for two reasons. Either a shock hits the ﬁrm (λ), or he quits
through his own fault (s),
rJEi(y)=wi + λ[JU1 − JEi(y)] + s[JU0 − JEi(y)]. (4)
Note in equation (4) that whether a worker was eligible or not for beneﬁts, he might be subject
t oas h o c kλ in which case he’ll be laid oﬀ and consequently receive unemployment beneﬁts,
transitioning to state JU1; or hemight become ineligible if he gets hit by a shock s which forces
him to quit and move to state JU0 . These future deviations from the original bargaining
positions will be taken into account in the subsequent Nash bargain, resulting in the "future
7entitlement" eﬀects I will soon discuss.
T h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o nf o rﬁrms is given by
JV =0 . (5)
Wage determination is given by the Nash bargaining solution over the match surplus. The
worker’s share of the match surplus is given by (for i =0 ,1)
JEi(y) − JUi = β(JFi(y) − JV + JEi(y) − JUi)=
β
1 − β
(JFi(y) − JV ). (6)
In addition, in a steady-state equilibrium, the following ﬂow equations must hold. The ﬂows
into and out of uninsured unemployment must be equal; that is,
u0θq(θ)=( 1− u0 − u1)s. (7)
The ﬂows into and out of insured unemployment must be equal,
u1θq(θ)=( 1− u0 − u1)λ. (8)
The ﬂow into and out of low wage employment must be equal,
u0θq(θ)=l0(s + λ). (9)
These equations are the extension of the Beveridge curve to the two-type (four states) environ-
ment.
2.2 Equilibrium: Deﬁnition and Characterization
In this section I deﬁne and solve for the equilibrium and prove an existence and uniqueness result.
In discussing the equations which describe the equilibrium, I show that a wage gap exists between
insured and uninsured workers. This wage gap, which exists because of UI beneﬁts, is discounted
by the expected duration of unemployment, and hence negatively related to equilibrium market
8tightness. I also show that individual wages take into account future deviations from current
eligibility status. Insured workers face the risk of losing their eligibility if they quit their job in
the future. Hence, they are compensated in advance for this contingency. Uninsured workers
take a wage cut to reﬂect the beneﬁt of future eligibility which the current job provides. I further
show that the wage diﬀerential is reduced by cross subsidization.
A steady-state equilibrium is a solution to the wages, the ﬂow variables, and the state values
{w0, w1, b u0, θ, u0, u1, l0, v} ∪ {Jji} satisfying
(i) the ﬂow equations (7) to (9)
(ii) the Bellman equations (1) to (4)
(iii) the free entry condition (5), and
(iv) the wage equations (6).
The equilibrium can be characterized as follows (see Figure 2). Deﬁne the average (or
expected) wages in the economy as Ew ≡ b u0w0 +( 1− b u0)w1. Then equilibrium and average
wages are given by the intersection of two curves: the creation curve and the expected wages
curve. The equilibrium diﬀerential wages w0 and w1 are then calculated using the equilibrium
market tightness. Consider ﬁrst the creation curve10,




This can also be thought of as the free entry condition. For expected proﬁts to be zero, the
expected wage bill must be equal to productivity minus ﬂow search costs. As search costs
increase when there are many ﬁrms (high market tightness), the expected wages must be lower.
Thus, the creation curve is downward sloping in (θ,Ew) space, and it can be interpreted as a
labor demand curve.
The second equilibrium equation is derived in steps. First, the two individual wage equations
are the solution to the Nash bargaining problem, and next the two wage equations are combined
as a weighted average to give the expected wage curve.
The two individual wage equations are derived from the Nash solution using the above




w0(y)=βy +( 1− β)rJU0 − λ(1 − β)(JU1 − JU0) (11)
= β[y + γ0θ +( 1− b u0)
(1 − β)θq(θ)
r + βθq(θ)




w1(y)=βy +( 1− β)rJU1 + s(1 − β)(JU1 − JU0) (13)
= β[y + γ0θ − b u0
(1 − β)θq(θ)
r + βθq(θ)




These equations dissect the various components of wages and trace the ways in which
workers’ eligibility for UI aﬀects wages directly and indirectly. I identify a direct entitlement
and future entitlement eﬀect, an external pecuniary eﬀect through the size of the insurance
market, and an additional general equilibrium eﬀect through market tightness, the last of which
I discuss in the next section.
Consider ﬁrst the direct eﬀect of UI. If all workers were always insured, the standard wage
solution would be w = z + β(y + γ0θ − z), which prescribes workers with a share β of surplus
above their entitlement to beneﬁts, z.12 Here, each worker receives a fraction β of the surplus
from production relative to his current insurance position. Hence, future deviations from the
current position are taken into account and corrected for. I call these corrections the future
entitlement eﬀect.
To see these, inspect ﬁrst the wage of the uninsured (11). The usual Nash bargaining
terms βy+(1−β)rJU0 correspond to the worker’s share from ﬂow output above his bargaining
position. The additional term −λ(1−β)(JU1−JU0) corrects for future receipt of beneﬁts, which
are beyond the worker’s entitlement given his current bargaining position. There’s a probability
rate of λ that the ﬁrm will lay him oﬀ, and he’ll end up unemployed and insured. He needs
to pay the ﬁrm a share of 1 − β from this gain in advance, through lower wages. This is the
future entitlement eﬀect. Note that the wage of the insured, w1, has a similar future entitlement
eﬀect, +s(1 − β)(JU1 − JU0), which is working in the opposite direction. An insured worker
11Using (6) , (4) and (2) Ig e tw(y)=βy +( 1− β)rJ
U − λ(1 − β)(J
U1 − J
U). The unemployment values
substituted into this equation are found by replacing (2) into (3) and using the creation equation (10) to replace
y − w0 . The process is similar for w1.
12Recall that the monetary utility from being unemployed was normalized to zero.
11is entitled to his unemployment beneﬁts, but might lose them if he quits at the rate s.H e i s
compensated in advance for this contingency by having his wages increase further, above the
standard entitlement (or bargaining position) eﬀect of (1 − β)z.
Apart from the entitlement and future entitlement eﬀects, there is yet another direct impact
of beneﬁts on wages, through a pecuniary externality, whereby the insured and uninsured cross-
subsidize each other. This arises because a ﬁrm opens up a vacancy expecting to pay an average
wage, but ends up paying an uninsured worker (for instance) a lower wage. The ﬁrm’s gain
from paying lower wages than expected is shared with the (uninsured) worker, thus increasing
his wages slightly, in proportion with the fraction who are insured, (1− b u0). When the creation
relation is replaced in the unemployment values and then substituted into the wage equations
(12) and (14), I can track down this eﬀect resulting from the existence of the two worker-types
together. The uninsured experience a gain of β(1 − b u0)
(1−β)θq(θ)
r+βθq(θ) z, while the insured have their
wages adjusted by −βb u0
(1−β)θq(θ)
r+βθq(θ) z .
It is also useful at this stage to consider the wage gap, ∆w, between workers who were
previously UI recipients and those who were not eligible. It is given by
∆w ≡ w1(y) − w0(y) (15)
=
(1 − β)(r + λ + s)z
r + βθq(θ)
.
Beneﬁts, z, are the reason the wage gap exists in the ﬁrst place. The wage bargain gives insured
workers a share 1 − β of these beneﬁts to correct for future changes in worker status and the
consequent loss of (1−β)z to employers. The present value of this share of beneﬁts is discounted
by r+βθq(θ).E ﬀectively the wage gap decreases as vacancies increase. The reason is that higher
vacancies imply a higher exit rate from unemployment, so that the gains from beneﬁts are given
for a shorter period of time.
The second equilibrium equation, the expected wage equation, is derived as the average of
12the two individual wage equations (12) and (14),
Ew ≡ b u0w0(y)+( 1− b u0)w1(y) (16)
= β(y + γ0θ)+( 1− b u0)(1 − β)z +( 1− β)
z
r + βθq(θ)
[(1 − b u0)s − b u0λ].
The expected wage equation has three terms. The ﬁrst is the usual share β of employment gain
(y + γ0θ). The second term arises from the worker’s entitlement to beneﬁts z but only by the
fraction of unemployed who are actually entitled to it, (1−b u0). The last term keeps track of the
wage corrections due to expected deviations from the initial bargaining position. Below I show
that when separations are exogenous, this last term disappears.
To solve for the insurance rate, b u0, I use two of the steady-state ﬂow equations. From (7)






λb u0 = s(1 − b u0). (17)
A steady-state equilibrium requires the measure of uninsured who later become insured to be
equal to the measure of insured who later become uninsured.
Plugging this relationship into the expected wage equation (16) eliminates the last term.
The corrections for future deviations from the initial bargaining position are washed out across
the two groups. This also implies that the expected wage curve is unambiguously increasing in
market tightness, Ew = β(y + γ0θ)+( 1− b u0)(1 − β)z .
The creation equation (10), the expected wage equation (16), and the equation for steady-
state ﬂows (17), solve for the market tightness and average wages in the economy, (θ,Ew). To
provide a complete solution I need to solve further for u0 and u1. Using the last steady-state












Note that the solution for the insurance rate, b u0 = s
λ+s, is solely determined by the exogenous
rates of separations. When I extend the model in the next section to allow for workers’ entry
decisions I will endogenize this insurance rate of the unemployed.
Using the solution for b u0, I can now write the second equilibrium equation, the expected
wage equation, as
Ew = β(y + γ0θ)+
λ
λ + s
(1 − β)z. (18)
Thus the equilibrium conditions are reduced to two equations, (10) and (18), and the follow-
ing existence result can be proved:
Proposition 1 An equilibrium exists if y> λ
s+λz and it is unique.
Proof. An equilibrium exists if there is a solution to the creation (10) and expected wage
equation (18). Substituting out Ew, an equilibrium exists if there is a solution to βγ0θ +( r +
λ+s)
γ0
q(θ) =( 1−β)(y− λ
λ+sz).S i n c et h eF(θ) ≡ βγ0θ+(r+λ+s)
γ0
q(θ) is positive and increasing
in θ and has limθ→0 F(θ)=0and limθ→∞ F(θ)=∞, there exists a unique solution for θ as long
as y− λ
λ+sz>0. Uniqueness of the equilibrium follows since the rest of the equilibrium variables
are uniquely determined from θ.
2.3 Results: Total and Diﬀerential Eﬀects of Beneﬁts
Introducing a system of partial UI creates wage dispersion and has aggregate eﬀects on average
wages, market tightness, and the derived unemployment rate. This section provides the relevant
comparative static results on the eﬀect of beneﬁts, and proves the main results.
Since equilibrium is determined by the market tightness and the average wages in the market,
this is the natural starting point:
Proposition 2 The total eﬀect of beneﬁts on expected wages and market tightness
(i) Expected wages increase with beneﬁts.
(ii) Market tightness decreases with beneﬁts.
14Proof. See appendix.
Even in the presence of the uninsured, the standard aggregate results hold. Beneﬁts have
a positive eﬀect on the average wage and a negative eﬀect on market tightness. Although
the uninsured are willing to accept lower wages in the current match, their loss is more than
compensated for by the gains of the insured. This is intuitively true since the reason for current
lower wages is the expectation of future gains from the insurance system. So overall, workers
can expect to have higher wages. In this exogenous separation case the wage adjustments due
to future deviations from current eligibility status are exactly washed out across the two groups.
The overall expected wage gain is proportional to the fraction of unemployed workers who are
insured, (1− b u0). Since this leaves the ﬁrm with lower proﬁts, the creation margin suﬀers, with
a smaller relative number of ﬁrms entering the market or a lower market tightness.
Since higher beneﬁts decrease the equilibrium ratio of vacancies to unemployment, matching
becomes slower for workers, and they can expect to have longer unemployment spells. The next
result formally shows that,
Proposition 3 Unemployment increases with beneﬁts.













By Proposition 2 dθ/dz < 0, and since d(θq(θ))/dθ > 0 by the assumption on the matching
technology, the result follows.
However, the partial UI system does introduce new diﬀerentials between the insured and the
uninsured. First is the wage gap:















Recall that the wage gap is driven by the discounted present value of beneﬁts which insured
workers have, ∆w =
(1−β)(r+λ+s)z
r+βθq(θ) .A ni n c r e a s ei nb e n e ﬁts, z , directly increases the wage gap,
and this increase is magniﬁed through the lower creation margin (that is, θ is lower). A multiplier
eﬀect exists because a lower vacancy-to-unemployment rate means that the unemployed workers
have a harder time matching with ﬁrms, will stay unemployed longer, and thus will enjoy the
gains from UI beneﬁts longer. The gain to the insured is therefore enhanced by the market
tightness response.
Since beneﬁts increase both the average wage and the wage gap, the following corollary
results:
Corollary 1 Beneﬁts increase the wages of the insured.
Higher beneﬁts increase the wage of the insured directly through the higher bargaining
position of workers (or the "entitlement eﬀect"). However, there is an additional eﬀect through
lower market tightness. The corollary states that the complex contribution of the lower matching
rate θq(θ) does not overturn the initial wage increase.
Finally, the eﬀects of beneﬁts on the wages of the uninsured are:
Proposition 5 Beneﬁts decrease the wages of the uninsured.
Proof. See appendix.
An increase in UI directly decreases the wages uninsured workers get. While their bargaining
position is not aﬀected by the increase in beneﬁts, they stand to gain higher unemployment
beneﬁts when they will be laid oﬀ in the future. In the bargaining outcome, this future gain is
deducted from their wage, since currently they are not entitled to any beneﬁts. In other words,
workers are willing to take lower wages because of the prospects of future insurance.
Think of the wage curves as the wages workers demand for a given labor supplied.14 In
other words, the wage equations are the labor supply curves. If higher unemployment beneﬁts
14This is a natural interpretation when the creation equation is not substituted into the wage equation, as it is
done in the appendix.
16reduce the wage demanded by the uninsured, they are in fact willing to work for lower wages.
Their incentive to work has increased. Adding an entry decision permits workers to change
their behavior in response to changes in market conditions. I can then explicitly talk about the
diﬀerential incentive eﬀects of UI and derive an endogenous rate of insurance.
3 Endogenous Entry Decision
In the simple model above, workers didn’t make any employment decisions since productivity
was such that they always preferred working to unemployment. Since workers didn’t make any
work decision, all eﬀects went through the wage bargain and the adjustment of creation by ﬁrms.
To be able to speak about an incentive eﬀect, workers must be given a choice to make. I do
this by introducing a stochastic matching productivity, and the worker’s entry decision or his
reservation wage.15
Adding stochastic productivity and an entry decision produces two more worthwhile results.
First, the economy’s insurance rate is now endogenous. In the steady state, the fraction of
insured out of the unemployed (b u0) is not simply the exogenous rate of quits to total separations
( s
s+λ) as before, but is determined in equilibrium through both types’ decision to enter the
employment relationship. This takes away the convenient but artiﬁcial feature of the previous
model where the wage compensations across the two groups disappear. Also, adding uncertainty
to the model introduces an ampliﬁcation of the wage/entry gap through a term resembling an
option value. I discuss this later. Note that the entry decision can also be interpreted as a search
decision, whereby a worker can decide to prolong search and unemployment duration.16
I now extend the model to allow for stochastic job matches. Productivity y is realized after
the match is made, and then the worker decides whether to continue searching or to take up em-
ployment (his decision also corresponds to the ﬁrm’s decision). Since a worker’s value increases
with productivity, this decision deﬁnes entry productivities (or reservation productivities) R0
for the uninsured and R1 for the insured.
15Similar results are obtained when the layoﬀ decision is endogenized, that is, when a worker-ﬁrm pair decides
when to dissolve a match due to low productivity.
16However, the results are diﬀerent if a search intensity choice is added to the model, in which case the worker’s
choice must be made prior to meeting a ﬁrm and before the worker’s and the ﬁrm’s interests are aligned.
17Formally I introduce the two entry conditions (for i =0 ,1)
JEi(Ri)=JUi (19)
and modify all employment values and wages to depend on productivity and all unemployment
values to incorporate the appropriate expectation given the decision variables Ri.
The Bellman equation for a vacant ﬁrm is





(JF0(s) − JV )dF(s)+( 1− b u0)
Z y
R1
(JF1(s) − JV )dF(s)
¸
. (20)
The proﬁts JFi(y)−JV now depend on the realized productivity, y, for all matches that proceed
to the production phase, y ∈ [Ri,y].
The value for a ﬁrm employing a previously uninsured worker (i =0 ) or previously insured





+ s[JV − JFi(y)]. (21)
Similarly for workers, the value for an unemployed worker depends on his eligibility status
i =0 ,1 and his expected gains from future employment,
rJUi = zi+ θq(θ)
Z y
Ri
(JEi(s) − JUi)dF(s). (22)
The value for an employed worker again depends on his previous insurance status, i =0 ,1
and the realized productivity, y,
rJEi(y)=wi(y)+λ[JU1 − JEi(y)] + s[JU0 − JEi(y)]. (23)
18The wage bargaining solutions satisfy
JEi(y) − JUi = β(JFi(y) − JV + JEi(y) − JUi)=
β
1 − β
(JFi(y) − JV ),
with θ and b u0 deﬁned as before.
The ﬂow equations are also modiﬁed (see Figure 3). Now the ﬂows out of unemployment
depend on the entry variables Ri. A worker becomes employed if a match takes place (at a rate
θq(θ)) and furthermore if the realized productivity is high enough (which occurs with probability
1−F(Ri)). This gives the following steady-state ﬂow equations. Equating the ﬂows in and out
of uninsured unemployment yields,
u0θq(θ)[1 − F(R0)] = (l0 + l1)s. (24)
Equating the ﬂows in and out of insured unemployment yields,
u1θq(θ)[1 − F(R1)] = (l0 + l1)λ. (25)
The ﬂow in and out of low wage employment is given by
u0θq(θ)[1 − F(R0)] = l0(s + λ). (26)
Finally, the accounting equality is
l0 + l1 =1− u0 − u1. (27)
3.1 Solution
The solution for θ , R0 , R1,a n db u0 are given by the four equations: ERfirm (the ﬁrms’ creation











Figure 3: Flows (Endogenous Entry)
by workers), and the equation for b u0 derived from the condition for a steady-state equilibrium.
The creation equation is
b u0R0 +( 1− b u0)R1 = y −











The uninsured entry equation is
(r + s + θq(θ)β)R0 + θq(θ)β
Z y
R0
F(s)ds = θq(θ)βy − λR1. (29)
The insured entry equation is
(r + λ + θq(θ)β)R1 + θq(θ)β
Z y
R1
F(s)ds =( r + λ + s)z + θq(θ)βy − sR0. (30)
The steady-state insurance rate is given by
b u0 =
s(1 − F(R1))
s(1 − F(R1)) + λ(1 − F(R0))
. (31)
From the two entry equations (29) and (30) I construct the average entry, ERwork, and the
20entry gap, ∆R,
b u0R0 +( 1− b u0)R1 =( 1− b u0)z +
β
1 − β
θγ0 +[ ( 1− b u0)s − λb u0]
(R1 − R0)
r + λ + s
, (32)
R1 − R0 =










Wages are given by
w0(y)=βy +( 1− β)R0 (34)
w1(y)=βy +( 1− β)R1,
so that
w1(y) − w0(y)=( 1 − β)(R1 − R0) (35)
=( 1 − β)










The ﬁrst term is the same as in the model without stochastic matching. The second (new)
term is due to uncertainty. It reﬂects the higher option value that nonrecipients get from a
relationship because they begin employment sooner (R0 <R 1). They pay (1−β) of this in their
wages, reducing their wages by this extra term.
The unique equilibrium can be depicted by the intersection of the ERfirm (expected cre-
ation) and ERwork (average entry) curves. This gives the equilibrium market tightness θ∗. The
equilibrium entry productivities R0 and R1 are then found given this market tightness (see
Figure 4).
3.2 Discussion
The ﬁrm’s creation decision is basically unchanged. As before, free entry implies that vacancies
will be opened to the point where the costs of opening a vacancy γ0 are covered by the expected












Figure 4: Equilibrium (Endogenous Entry)












r + λ + s
Z y
R0
(s − R0)dF(s)+( 1− b u0)
(1 − β)




That is, ﬁrms choose market tightness (their vacancy opening) such that the expected cost of a
vacancy is equal to the expected productivity. Firms take the expected entry decisions (R0, R1
and b u0) as given, so that this curve does not shift with beneﬁts, z. Increasing UI is represented
by a shift along this curve to a new equilibrium, due to the shift of the worker’s entry curve.
The model’s value-added is the additional entry decisions which introduces the incentive
eﬀect of UI. Workers decide to enter the productive relationship with the matched ﬁrm if the
value they get is higher than the value of staying unemployed. Higher values of unemployment
induce workers to postpone entry by increasing the threshold productivity deﬁned by JE0(R0)=
JU0. Note that, given Nash bargaining, this corresponds to the point where the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between staying vacant and producing. This in turn means that at the threshold, productivity
22is equal to wages (R0 = w0(R0)). Using this fact in the wage bargaining solution I ﬁnd that
R0 = rJU0 − λ(JU1 − JU0) (37)
R1 = rJU1 + s(JU1 − JU0).
In their entry decision workers realize there’s an additional value to employment due to the
expected change in eligibility. Since the uninsured expect a future entitlement of UI beneﬁts
through work, they are willing to enter earlier, at a point where productivity equals their current
unemployment value minus the future gain due to eligibility change, and similarly, for the
insured, the entry decision is postponed due to the expected loss of beneﬁt eligibility in case of a
quit. Wages simply track the entry productivities in a very simple way: wi(y)=βy+(1−β)Ri.








, note the new term,
which resembles an option value term. Uninsured workers are now willing to enter the rela-
tionship for lower productivities, not only because of the increased value of employment due to
future unemployment beneﬁts, but also because there is an amplifying eﬀect of this entry gap.
Given the earlier entry, uninsured workers’ option value from work is larger, which increases the
value from employment even further, reducing entry productivity.
Endogenous entry also implies that the fraction of uninsured to insured (b u0) is now endoge-
nously determined. Relative to the case where the steady-state ﬂows were exogenously deter-




s+λ . This also implies that (1 − b u0)s − b u0λ>0. Inspecting the
worker’s average productivity, shows
b u0R0 +( 1− b u0)R1 =( 1− b u0)z +
β
1 − β
θγ0 +[ ( 1− b u0)s − λb u0]
(R1 − R0)
r + λ + s
. (38)
Note that now the last term does not vanish as it did in the exogenous separation case. Rather,
the expected minimum productivity margin, b u0R0 +( 1− b u0)R1, is increasing with UI beneﬁts
twice. First it increases directly because of the beneﬁts given to the insured, (1−b u0)z. Next, this
eﬀect is magniﬁed by allowing the unemployed to adjust their behavior. Since the fraction of
23insured to uninsured is higher than when no entry decision was allowed, there is now a positive
discrepancy across the two groups which increases the average reservation wage and leads to
higher unemployment.
The comparative static results concerning the eﬀect of increased beneﬁts on the equilibrium
outcomes are similar to those derived when productivity took only two values. There is an
additional prediction regarding the eﬀect on the diﬀerential and total reservation productivities.
These eﬀects follow the eﬀects on wages. In particular, higher unemployment beneﬁts increase
the average entry productivity, increase the entry productivity for the insured worker, and
decrease the entry productivity for the uninsured worker. Proofs are provided in the appendix.
4 Calibration
To assess the magnitude of the diﬀerentials created by a partial insurance system, I now calibrate
the model to ﬁt U.S. unemployment behavior and other estimated parameters of the model. The
end of the section discusses how the model’s prediction ﬁts the available evidence.
The new feature of the model is that eligibility status is based on the reason for being
unemployed. From 1988 the Current Population Survey (CPS) has coded the reasons for un-
employment based on ﬁve categories. The categories and their average rates over the period
1988-2005 are: job loser on layoﬀ (0.16), other job loser (0.35), job leaver (0.11), new entrant
(0.08) and re-entrant (0.29).17 The model considers all job losers as eligible for UI, whether on
layoﬀ or otherwise. Those who were ﬁred for cause are ignored because they cannot be identi-
ﬁed. However, over time these series show that termination levels spike up during recessions,
suggesting the bulk of termination is not due to workers’ behavior (see Figure 5). The eligibility
m e a s u r ei sa l s oc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h a to fB l a n ka n d Card (1991) calculated for an earlier period
(1977-1987). Separations that are due to a job quit result in ineligibility. Accordingly, the rate
of quits to job loss is taken to be s
λ =0 .22. The calibration follows the model and abstracts
from ﬂows into and out of the labor force. Including those ﬂows will further discount the value
17Although the CPS has slightly changed this variable in 1994, the edited variable is comparable to the previous
period. Note also that a person is considered to be on layoﬀ if he perceives his job loss as temporary and has high
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Figure 5: Reason for Unemployment (1988-2006)
of being unemployed — assuming most of the ﬂows out of the labor force are due to discouraged
workers. The only number that would fundamentally change is the insurance rate, which would
be substantially lower when the new ﬂows are considered and for this reason is not reported.
Ignoring those ﬁred and those entering and re-entering the labor force, as well as ignoring the
limit on the duration of beneﬁts, all tend to overstate the eﬀect of insurance. The results is
therefore an upper limit to the eﬀect of beneﬁts.
T h et i m ep e r i o di sn o r m a l i z e dt ob eaq u a r t e r . T h er a t eo fs e p a r a t i o ni st a k e nt ob e
s + λ =0 .1, which is the average quarterly rate estimated by Shimer (2005). Productivity
is normalized to y =1and the value of unemployment beneﬁts is taken to be initially z =0 .4
which is around the average replacement rate across U.S. states.18 The yearly discount rate
is 0.05 (or a quarterly r =0 .012). For the matching function I adopt the following constant
18The after-tax replacement rate is probably higher. See Gruber (1994) table A1 for estimates on replacement
rates.
25returns-to-scale functional form: q(θ)=μθ1−α and use a midrange estimate of the matching
elasticity from Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) of α =0 .5. This is a useful benchmark, since in
an eﬃcient market the bargaining power is equal to the matching elasticity, which in this case
would produce the conventional bargaining power of β =0 .5. The last two parameters, the cost
of opening up a vacancy (γ) and the parameter of the matching function (μ), jointly determine
the unemployment rate and vacancy to unemployment rate. As there is very little information
about the latter, it is set equal to one in the initial equilibrium to (θ =1 ) . Then I match the
average unemployment rate (1988-2005) of 5.8.T h i sp i n sd o w nγ =0 .59 and μ =1 .6 (see Table
1).19
Parameter
    Productivity   y=1
    Replacement rate  z=0.4
    Discount rate  r=0.012
    Quit rate  s=0.02
    Layoff rate  λ=0.08
    Matching function 
    Bargaining power  β=0.5
    Cost of vacancy   γ=0.59
Parameter Values in Calibration of the Model
5 . 0 6 . 1 ) (
− = θ θ q
Table 1: Model Parameters
Using the above parameter values I ﬁnd that an initial unemployment replacement rate of
0.4 is creating a 3% wage gap between the insured and the uninsured. Since this is an upper
limit, the calibrated model predicts a small wage gap. This is mostly due to the low incidence of
unemployment found in the data. The average unemployment duration is around three months.
T h e s ev a l u e sa r eq u i t er e s p o n s i v et oac h a n g ei nb e n e ﬁts. An increase in the generosity of beneﬁts
by 10 percentage points increases unemployment duration by 6% (elasticity of 0.3), and while
on average wages hardly increase (0.3% or elasticity of 0.01), the wage gap increases by 33%
19Alternatively, I could try to match the empirical job ﬁnding rate of 0.45 a month, or 1.35 quarterly (Shimer
2005). Given that the separation rate is 0.1, this would imply an equilibrium unemployment rate of 6.8%. The
results below would not be much changed.
26(elasticity of 1.3). The large response of the wage diﬀerential is partially due to a multiplier
eﬀect for which the equilibrium vacancy/unemployment rate is responsible. As beneﬁts rise, the
vacancy to unemployment ratio declines, making the duration of unemployment — and hence the
value of unemployment beneﬁts — larger. To asses how large the general equilibrium eﬀect is I
hold constant the ratio of vacancies to unemployment and compare this analytic "counterfactual"
to the true eﬀect. Thus a quarter of the increase in the wage gap is attributed to the general
equilibrium adjustment in market tightness. The large general equilibrium eﬀect is in part
due to the large elasticity of market tightness with respect to unemployment beneﬁts, which is
εθ = −0.56. Note that this market tightness elasticity is much higher than the wage elasticities
(εw0 =—0.01 and εw1 =0.03 for the low and high wages). Adding heterogeneity to workers’
unemployment values creates the sensitivity of market tightness relative to wage adjustment
that is missing from the standard search model.20
Given the small magnitude of the predicted wage gap, it is not surprising that this diﬀerential
is hard to detect empirically.21 More importantly, any attempt to detect the diﬀerential eﬀects
of beneﬁts on wages will encounter a more fundamental identiﬁcation problem: since receipt
of beneﬁts is nonrandom, the diﬀerence between wages of insured and uninsured workers will
largely reﬂect diﬀerences between these two groups. This selection problem is inherent in the
U.S. insurance system since eligibility status is derived from the reason for unemployment,
which is largely endogenous.22 Nevertheless, using such a selection-biased comparison between
outcomes of recipients and nonrecipients, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) found a 7% increase in
post-unemployment wages of older males. However, more recent studies, which use exogenous
variation in beneﬁts receipt to identify the eﬀect of UI on the insured, ﬁnd small or negligible
eﬀects on post-employment wages but sizeable eﬀects on unemployment duration, consistent
with my results. The estimated elasticities of duration with respect to the beneﬁta m o u n tr a n g e
20See Pries (2006) for an account of how workers’ heterogeneity can possibly solve the Shimer (2005) critique
of the low volatility implied by the standard search model.
21Recall that the predicted wage gap is even smaller once we allow for heterogeneous productivity and an entry
productivity choice.
22In the CPS data, a striking diﬀerence between between the groups is that those who quit are on average four
years younger than those whose jobs were terminated by the employer. This diﬀerence is indicative of selection
on other unobservables.
27from 0.4 to 0.6.23 Recent work by Card, Chetty and Weber (2006) attempts to ﬁnd wage and
employment eﬀects of beneﬁt receipt. Using a regression discontinuity design, they ﬁnd that
there is an economically signiﬁcant eﬀect of beneﬁts on the duration of unemployment, but only
less than a 1% increase in mean subsequent wages (at the 95% conﬁdence interval). While these
studies are free of selection problems, they only identify the eﬀects on the insured. The analysis
in this paper suggests that a wage gap may exist between the two groups that can be attributed
not only to an increase in the wages of the insured but also to a decline in the wages of the
uninsured.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this, I augmented a search model to account for the existence of unemployed workers who are
not currently receiving UI beneﬁts; I then investigated whether their increased incentive to work
can dominate the lower incentives of the insured unemployed. I have shown that the conjecture
in the literature is false, and that in equilibrium the total eﬀe c to fu n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁts is
driven by the fraction of workers who are insured and receiving beneﬁts. Higher unemployment
beneﬁts have the standard average eﬀect. They decrease the vacancy/unemployment rate and
increase expected wages. However, beneﬁts have a diﬀerent eﬀect on the uninsured than on the
insured. When beneﬁts increase, the uninsured value employment more because of the possibility
of future beneﬁts receipt. They are therefore willing to take lower wages. The insured experience
a wage increase due to the direct increase in their bargaining position and an additional increase
to compensate them for the possibility that they will need to quit the job and lose their UI
eligibility.
In equilibrium, these partial eﬀects are attenuated by the existence of two types of unem-
ployed through a pecuniary externality. Because ﬁrms’ entry decision is targeted at an average
employee, there is a form of cross-subsidization between the two types of workers. General
equilibrium also works to reduce wages of all workers through the lower market tightness. This
results in a further reduction in the wages of the uninsured and a smaller increase in the wages
23See Krueger and Meyer (2002) for a survey.
28of the insured. When the unemployed respond endogenously to employment incentives, these
results are intensiﬁed. Given the stronger incentive to work (through future entitlement), the
uninsured leave unemployment at a higher rate than the insured, resulting in a higher insurance
rate of the economy. The calibration of the model is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding of
small wage eﬀects and larger duration elasticities.
There are a few lessons to be drawn from the discussion in the paper. In the context
of the benchmark search model, ultimately what matters for welfare is the net increase in
insurance. That there is another population that does not directly beneﬁt from the program has
distributional consequences but only small aggregate eﬀects. Furthermore, while the ineligible
population suﬀers from reduced wages in the short run, they too experience an increase in their
expected lifetime utility.
It is worthwhile to point out the limitations of the analysis. First, since this is a steady-state
analysis, it does not rule out that during the adjustment process the response of the uninsured
will overwhelm the response of the insured. Second, it may be possible to augment the model
such that, even in the steady-state, the response of the uninsured will dominate. However, the
analysis here suggests that an additional mechanism would be required, one that would overturn
the intuitive result that the average eﬀect depends on net beneﬁts.
The distinction between layoﬀs and quits and its implication for policy and for wage setting
can be further explored. In this paper, separate groups are formed because identical workers
are hit with diﬀerent shocks. More realistically, adding ex ante heterogeneity between workers
will entail diﬀerent characteristics of quitters and laid-oﬀ workers, including diﬀerent response
elasticities. Another way to carve a more natural distinction between layoﬀsa n dq u i t si st h r o u g h
the introduction of incomplete contracts. When the objectives of employed workers and ﬁlled
ﬁrms are no longer aligned, there is a meaningful diﬀerence between quit-shocks that hit workers
and layoﬀ-shocks that hit ﬁrms. Furthermore, adding a contracting friction, which is likely to
be present due to workers’ limited liability, enriches the set of tools the government can use to
inﬂuence the bilateral employment relationship. Then policy instruments, such as experience-
rated taxes, become consequential.24
24Blanchard and Tirole (2004) address some of these questions. Exploring the policy implications of the worker-
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6.1 Proofs for Section 2
Claim 1 Total eﬀect of beneﬁts on expected wages and market tightness:
(i) Expected wages increase with beneﬁts.
(ii) Market tightness decreases with beneﬁts.
Proof. By implicit diﬀerentiation of the equilibrium equations. creation (10) and expected
wages (18) give us a system in (θ,Ew):
F1 : Ew−
∙





F2 : Ew− [β(y + γ0θ)+( 1− b u0)(1 − β)z]=0 .





(1 − b u0)(1 − β)(r + λ + s)
γ0
q2q0
−βγ0 +( r + λ + s)
γ0
q2q0 > 0.
Both numerator and denominator are negative since q
0









(1 − b u0)(1 − β)








ﬁrm relationship is in the spirit of the Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) program.
30The total eﬀect is therefore only due to the actual increase in beneﬁts, which is only by the
fraction who are insured, (1 − b u0).
Claim 2 Beneﬁts increase the wage gap.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating the wage gap,
∆ ≡ w1(y) − w0(y)=























(1 − b u0)(1 − β)





since q0 < 0.
Claim 3 Beneﬁts decrease the wages of the uninsured.
Proof. To derive the total eﬀect of beneﬁts on the uninsured it is useful to present the wage
equations without substitution of the creation equation. In this alternative representation of




r + λ + s + θq(θ)
r + λ + s + βθq(θ)
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r + λ + s + θq(θ)
r + λ + s + βθq(θ)
¶
+( 1− β)z
r + s + βθq(θ)
r + βθq(θ)
µ
r + λ + s




r + λ + s + θq(θ)
r + λ + s + βθq(θ)
¸
+( 1− b u0)(1 − β)z
r + λ + s





r + λ + s
r + λ + s + βθq(θ)
¶
[(1 − b u0)s − b u0λ].
25To derive these, proceed as before to derive w(y)=βy +( 1− β)rJ




U does not use the creation relation. Rather, the expression above is used to replace the term
y − w.
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6.2 Proofs and Derivations for Section 3
I ﬁrst present a brief guide to deriving the equilibrium equations. Using the creation equation










The value for unemployed workers is derived by plugging the wage equation (??) into the un-















In the wage bargain equation (??) replace JEi and JFi from (23) and (21) to get wages in terms
of productivity and unemployment values,
w0(y)=βy +( 1− β)rJU0 − λ(1 − β)(JU1 − JU0) (41)
w1(y)=βy +( 1− β)rJU1 + s(1 − β)(JU1 − JU0).
Next solve for the entry decision by using the wage equation (??) at y = Ri. Note that JEi(Ri)=
JUi so that the ﬁrms must also be indiﬀerent between producing or not at the entry level, or
JFi(Ri)=0 . Using this with (21) JFi(y)=
y−wi(y)
r+λ+s results in Ri = wi(Ri). Substitute for the
32above wage equations (41) at Ri, to ﬁnd
R0 = rJU0 − λ(JU1 − JU0) (42)
R1 = rJU1 + s(JU1 − JU0).
This results in JU1 − JU0 = R1−R0
r+λ+s and in a linear relationship between wages and entry pro-
ductivity, wi(y)=βy +( 1− β)Ri. Plug this wage into (21) to solve for the ﬁrm values
JFi(y)=
(1 − β)(y − Ri)
r + λ + s
. (43)
Plug these into the unemployment values derived in (40) to have (after integrating by parts),
rJUi = zi+
θq(θ)β
r + λ + s
∙






This also gives the diﬀerence between unemployment values as
r(JU1 − JU0)=z +
θq(θ)β
r + λ + s
∙






Use this in (42) to solve implicitly for the entry productivities (29) and (30) in the text. Replacing
(43) in (39) gives the creation equation(28). This completes the derivation.
I now prove the main comparative statics result. Note that in the ﬁrm’s creation equation
(28) ﬁrms choose market tightness (their vacancy opening) such that the expected cost of a
vacancy is equal to the expected productivity. Firms take the expected entry decisions (R0, R1
and b u0) as given, so that this curve does not shift with the level of beneﬁts, z.I n c r e a s i n g U I
is represented by a shift along this curve to a new equilibrium, due to the shift of the worker’s
entry curve.
To ﬁnd the ﬁnd how the entry curve shifts with beneﬁts, z, I need to see how all its com-
ponents shift with z. I begin with these partial derivatives, and continue to show the total
equilibrium eﬀect of increased z is to reduce market tightness, to increase R1, to reduce R0,a n d
to increase the wage/entry gap.








F1 :( r + s + θq(θ)β)R0 + θq(θ)β
Z y
R0
F(s)ds − θq(θ)βy + λR1 =0
F2 :( r + λ + θq(θ)β)R1 + θq(θ)β
Z y
R1
F(s)ds − (r + λ + s)z − θq(θ)βy + sR0 =0





(r +( r + λ + s)λ)
[r + s + θq(θ)β(1 − F(R))][r + λ + θq(θ)β(1 − F(R1))] − λs
= −λA < 0
A ≡
(r + λ + s)






−[r + s + θq(θ)β(1 − F(R0))](r + λ + s) − 0
[r + s + θq(θ)β(1 − F(R0))][r + s + θq(θ)β(1 − F(R1))] − λs
=[ r + s + θq(θ)β(1 − F(R0))]A>0.
(iii)
∆R ≡ R1 − R0 =


































F(R1)[r + s + θq(θ)β(1 − F(R0))]A
=
(r + λ + s)+θq(θ)βA{F(R0)λ + F(R1)[r + s + θq(θ)β(1 − F(R0))]}
r + θq(θ)β
> 0.












Proof. (ii) can be seen, but formally,
1 − b u0 =
λ(1 − F(R0))
s(1 − F(R1)) + λ(1 − F(R0))
d(1 − b u0)
dz
=










−λf(R0)[s(1 − F(R1)) + λ(1 − F(R0))] − λ2f(R0)(1 − F(R0))
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d[(1 − b u0)s − λb u0](R1 − R0)
dz
=





[(1−b u0)s−λb u0] > 0,
because all terms are positive. The only term I need to show is positive is
d[(1 − b u0)s − λb u0]
dz
=
d[s − b u0(s + λ)]
dz
= −(s + λ)
db u0
dz
= −(s + λ)(−YX) > 0.
Claim 6 Market tightness declines with unemployment beneﬁts ,dθ∗
dz < 0.
Proof. Deﬁne the two equilibrium equations for ERand θ (equations ERfirm and ERwork),
G1 : b u0R0 +( 1− b u0)R1 − y +











G2 : b u0R0 +( 1− b u0)R1 − (1 − b u0)z −
β
1 − β
θγ0 − [(1 − b u0)s − λb u0]
(R1 − R0)
r + λ + s
=0 .
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